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a b s t r a c t
Network formation among individuals constitutes an important part of many OR processes, but relatively
little is known about how individuals make their linking decisions in networks. This article provides an in-
vestigation of heuristic effects in individual linking decisions for network formation in an incentivized lab-
experimental setting. Our mixed logit analysis demonstrates that the inherent complexity of the network
linking setting causes individuals’ choices to be systematically less guided by payoff but more guided by sim-
pler heuristic decision cues, and that this shift is systematically stronger for social payoff than for own payoff.
Furthermore, we show that the speciﬁc complexity factors value transferability and social tradeoff aggravate
the former effect. These heuristic effects have important research and policy implications in areas that involve
network formation.
© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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t1. Introduction
Network formation among individuals has important effects in
many social, operational, and economic contexts, ranging fromword-
of-mouth communications among consumers (e.g., Iacobucci & Hop-
kins, 1992) and virtual communities (e.g., Wellman et al., 1996) to job
opportunities (e.g., Granovetter, 1995) and mortality (e.g., Berkman
& Syme, 1979). Therefore, the OR community has lately modeled
such decentral network creation processes (e.g., Baron, Durieu, Haller,
& Solal, 2006; Demaine, Hajiaghayi, Mahini, & Zadimoghaddam,
2012; Fabrikant, Luthra, Maneva, Papadimitriou, & Shenker, 2003;
Harmsen - van Hout, Herings, & Dellaert, 2013; Hellmann & Staudigl,
2014; Janssen & Monsuur, 2012; Monsuur, 2007; Olaizola & Valen-
ciano, 2014). The applications of these models vary frommilitary and
other communication networks to large-scale networking settings as
the Internet and their approaches differ from non-cooperative and
cooperative game theory to structural optimization mechanisms.
In the current paper, we comply with the recent call by
Hämäläinen, Luoma, and Saarinen (2013) to explicitly consider
behavioral phenomena within OR processes, as these processes are∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +49 241 80 49835; fax: +49 241 80 49 829.
E-mail addresses: mharmsen@eonerc.rwth-aachen.de (M.J.W. Harmsen - van
Hout), dellaert@ese.eur.nl (B.G.C. Dellaert), p.herings@maastrichtuniversity.nl
(P.J.J. Herings).
1 Tel.: +31 10 40 81 353; fax: +31 10 40 89 169.
2 Tel.: +31 43 38 83 824, +31 43 38 83 636; fax: +31 43 38 84 878.
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0377-2217/© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.ighly sensitive to behavioral effects. Accordingly, the abovemen-
ioned OR models on decentral network creation may result in op-
osite recommendations for optimal interventions. Although the
pproaches of these models vary in several respects, they all take op-
imizing individuals as a starting point, at most with some random
eviation therefrom (e.g., Baron et al., 2006; Hellmann & Staudigl,
014), whereas we investigate in how far real people systematically
eviate from this assumption.
There exists a recent and increasing experimental literature on
etwork formation. One stream in this literature is involved with
esting integral game-theoretic models of network formation. They
nclude variants of Bala and Goyal’s (2000) noncooperative network
ormation model (e.g., Berninghaus, Ehrhart, & Ott, 2006; Callander
Plott, 2005), Jackson and Wolinsky’s (1996) pairwise cooperative
etwork formation model (e.g., Deck & Johnson, 2004), and fully
ooperative network formation models like Jackson and van den
ouweland’s (2005) (e.g., Charness & Jackson, 2007). This research
dentiﬁes several conditions under which theoretically stable net-
ork structures are reproduced in the laboratory and addresses
heir eﬃciency. Another stream of experimental studies examines
he role of network formation as endogenously emerging in other
elevant settings of cooperative decision making (e.g., Brown, Falk,
Fehr, 2004; Corbae & Duffy, 2008; Di Cagno & Sciubba, 2010; Hauk
Nagel, 2001; Kirchsteiger, Niederle, & Potters, 2005). This research
hows that cooperation decisions are considerably inﬂuenced when
ndividuals are allowed to choose their partners versus when a ﬁxed
nteraction structure is imposed. Furthermore, Falk and Kosfeld
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a2012), Goeree, Riedl, and Ule (2008), and van Dolder and Buskens
2014) found social motives in network formation.
From this experimental work it became clear that in extremely
omplex, dynamic and strategic situations, predictions of network
ormation models are not always accurate. An issue that has been
argely ignored in this previous work though is that the complexity
hat individuals face in network formation may moderate their deci-
ions already on amuchmore basic level. Also disregarding dynamics
nd strategic interaction, the network formation process is typically
complex decision setting, for individuals’ utilities are not only de-
endent onmultiple characteristics of the choice options, like inmost
onsumer choices (e.g., Swait & Adamowicz, 2001), and even not only
dditionally on the number of other individuals choosing the same
ption, like with global network externalities (e.g., Katz & Shapiro,
985). They depend on all individuals in the entire pattern of network
inks, differently by their exact positions (e.g., Sundararajan, 2008).
urthermore, this network complexity varies depending on whether
he type of value that is exchanged through the network only affects
irect neighbors or is rather transferable via indirect links (Harmsen
van Hout et al., 2013) and depending on whether decision makers
are about the effects of their choices on other individuals (Fehr &
chmidt, 2003).
Such complexity may cause errors in their evaluation of different
ink formation options and hence in their choice process. Although
revious research acknowledges the mere existence of errors (e.g.,
harness & Jackson, 2007), these are simply modeled as random and
he underlying process remains undisclosed. In fact, the complexity
ausing such errors is typically removed by providing experimental
ubjects with numerical payoff information in the network linking
hoice interfaces. The objective of the current paper is to investigate
hether systematic heuristic shifts occur in individual decision mak-
ng in network formation as a function of complexity in the network
inking setting. Such complexity effects have been studied in several
ther choice contexts (e.g., Bonner, 1994; Dellaert, Donkers, & Soest,
012; Sung, Johnson, & Dror, 2009; Timmermans, 1993).
For this purpose, we focus on a static, non-strategic network set-
ing in which the decision maker can choose to create or delete one
ink or to do nothing. Such a situation constitutes the simplest net-
ork linking decision context, which allows us to study the effects
f complexity under highly controlled conditions. To prevent possi-
le confounding effects that do not originate from complexity of the
etwork setting but from strategic interaction among individuals, we
hus analyze individual one-period decisions, so decisions of others
n the network are deliberately excluded.
A typical decision task as we study is as follows. The individual
you” in Fig. 1 is connected with several other individuals in a net-
ork and is facing the one-shot choice problem to change at most
ne link: her choice options are to delete one of her existing links, so
ith “a” or “d”, to create a link with one individual that she is cur-
ently not directly connected to, so “b” or “c”, or not to change any-
hing. This results in a new network structure that generates value for
you” as well as for “a” through “d”, whereas “a” through “d” do not
ake any changes to the network.Fig. 1. Example network formation setting.
t
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uIn this individual decision-making experimentwe vary three com-
lexity factors that are relevant in the context of network linking.
he ﬁrst factor is baseline opacity of choice consequences. We in-
uce this by providing participants in some treatments with a com-
rehensive payoff table, which is an effective way to systematically
educe complexity. The second factor is transferability of value over
he network. We induce this by having participants in some treat-
ents derive value from direct neighbors only, which reﬂects a situ-
tion where social value is derived from communication, and having
articipants in other treatments derive value from direct as well as
ndirectly connected individuals, which reﬂects a situation where in-
ormational value is derived from communication. The third factor is
ocial tradeoff between own payoff and others’ payoff. We induce this
y informing participants in some treatments that nobody else was
ffected by their choices, and informing participants in other treat-
ents that the other participants in the room would be passively af-
ected by their choices in a speciﬁc way.
These factors complicate the choices that individuals make about
reating and maintaining links in the network. We examine whether
hese choices therefore become systematically less payoff-motivated
ut more guided by simpler heuristic decision cues, and furthermore
hether this shift to heuristic cues is systematically stronger for the
xtent that individuals’ choices are guided by social payoff, that is,
he payoff generated for other individuals, than for the extent they
re guided by own payoff.
In order to test our hypotheses, we confront participants in the
ab with multiple linking choice situations similar to the one in Fig. 1.
heir choices have a direct impact on their monetary rewards in the
xperiment, which differ with respect to the three abovementioned
omplexity factors (baseline payoff opacity, value transferability, so-
ial tradeoff), leading to different treatments. We perform a com-
rehensive parametric test of the hypotheses by estimating a mixed
i.e., randomparameters) logitmodel (Hensher, Rose, & Greene, 2005;
cFadden, 2001) incorporating several payoff and decision cue vari-
bles as well as their interactions with the complexity factors. This
llows us to investigate the impact of complex network properties on
ndividuals’ decisions, while allowing for heterogeneity of the deci-
ion makers.
Using this approach, we identify two cues that are merely quali-
atively related to payoff but appear to have a signiﬁcant additive im-
act on linking decisions: whether the choice option implies a devi-
tion from the status quo or not, and the number of direct neighbors
f the (potential) linking partner involved in the choice option. The
ffects of these heuristic cues are different under the various com-
lexity factors. Furthermore, we demonstrate that social preferences
hroughout strongly rely on a numerical overview of choice conse-
uences (which is usually provided in the laboratory but missing in
eal life), since apparent pro-social decision behavior in treatments
ith such an overview disappears in identical treatments without.
In Section 2, we present our theoretical framework and hypothe-
es. Section 3 describes the experimental design and the approach
sed for the mixed logit estimation. The results of our experiment
nd hypotheses tests are reported in Section 4. At the end of this sec-
ion, we perform several robustness checks, among which whether
bserved shifts in behavior may as well be captured by differences in
andomness among complexity conditions. Section 5 concludes the
aper with a discussion including implications for OR decentral net-
ork creation modeling.
. Theoretical framework
The objective of this section is to present our hypotheses
bout heuristic effects in individual decisions of network forma-
ion and compare them to predictions on individual choice behavior
nderlying the previous experimental network formation literature.
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and our hypotheses are presented in Section 2.2.
2.1. Prior decision models
Economic theory (e.g., Varian, 1992, chap. 7) models experienced
utility, that is, utility on which actual decisions are based, as follows.
The experienced utility that individual i derives from choosing option
j is given by:
i
j = f i(Payoff j),
where Payoffj is the payoff, that is, beneﬁts minus costs, obtained by i
when she chooses j and fi is a strictly increasing function. For empir-
ical applications, a random factor can be added (e.g., Hensher et al.,
2005, chap. 3):
i
j = f i(Payoff j) + εij.
We refer to this as the classical payoff-based model. For the example of
Fig. 1, this model predicts that from the ﬁve choice options allowed,
“you” chooses an option that provides her with the highest payoff.
Social preferences theory (Fehr & Schmidt, 2003) augments this
model by explicitly allowing for the fact that in addition to their own
payoff, individuals may take the payoff for other individuals into ac-
count whenmaking their decisions. In this case, the experienced util-
ity that individual i derives from choosing option j is given by:
i
j = f i
(
OwnPayoff j,
(
OthersPayoff
h
j
)
h =i
)
+ εij,
where OwnPayoffj is the payoff personally obtained by i when she
chooses j, OthersPayoffh
j
is the payoff obtained by another individual
h when i chooses j, and fi is a function reﬂecting how i holds others-
guided utility components in mind (e.g., inequity aversion, eﬃciency
preferences, etc.). We refer to this as the classical payoff-based model
extended with social preferences. For the example of Fig. 1, this model
predicts that from the ﬁve choice options allowed, “you” chooses an
option that causes her subjectively optimal combination of payoff for
herself and payoff for the four other individuals.
2.2. Hypotheses
Our anticipation is that these prior utilitymodels are not suﬃcient
to explain link choice behavior due to the presence of a speciﬁc type
of complexity. This complexity arises due to local network effects: an
individual’s payoff from her own choice now is affected by all individ-
uals in the entire pattern of network links, differently by their exact
positions (e.g., Sundararajan, 2008). Therefore, she ﬁnds it an inher-
ently complex task to determine the precise payoff of linking choice
options.
As humans are boundedly rational (Camerer, 1998), they cope
with complexity in decision making by simpliﬁcation, which com-
monly involves assessing a judgment object (e.g., linking choice op-
tion) using only the subset of properties of the object that are most
accessible, that is, that come most readily to mind, rather than using
all relevant properties (Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC research Group,
1999), as long as this leads them to a satisfying situation (Simon,
1956). This is clearly illustrated in the literature about the effects of
task complexity in several other contexts, like job candidate selec-
tion (Timmermans, 1993), audit judgment (Bonner, 1994), consumer
choice (Dellaert et al., 2012; Swait & Adamowicz, 2001), and betting
markets (Sung et al., 2009), but no empirical research to date has ad-
dressed such effects inmaking complex network formation decisions.
We propose two main types of heuristic shifts: (i) the complexity
in the network linking setting makes individuals’ choices systemati-
cally less payoff-guided than predicted by the classical payoff-based
model in that they are additionally motivated by other heuristic cues
(Section 2.2.1) and (ii) it makes them deviate from the predictions ofhe classical payoff-based model extended with social preferences in
eing systematically less socially motivated (Section 2.2.2). Further-
ore, we examine whether these effects are stronger under more
omplex linking decisionmaking conditions, where we vary the pres-
nce of value transferability and social tradeoff (Section 2.2.3).
.2.1. Payoff orientation
In the network formation setting, the decision maker’s payoff de-
ends on the network structure after completion of her choice, where
aving more connections is on the one hand beneﬁcial, since they
rovide access to additional resources, and on the other hand costly,
or it takes time and effort to maintain them. Because of network ef-
ects, it is typically a complex task for individuals to judge the exact
ayoff consequences of link choice options and we examine whether
herefore individuals systematically deviate from payoff orientation.
A psychological process of judgment simpliﬁcation is encountered
n the literature about conjunctive probability assessment, which
hows that individuals make predictions based on a correlation they
ssume to exist between the assessment variable and some other
ariable (e.g., Broniarczyk & Alba, 1994). Accordingly, individuals
ould partly substitute the payoff value of a link choice option by
escriptive attributes that can be determined more easily and that
re qualitatively related to it. Consequently, they could shift their ori-
ntation from exact payoff to the most basic cues (i) whether a link
hoice option involves actively deleting or creating a link or rather
oing nothing (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1991) describe how
he status quo is a predisposed option for decision makers), and (ii)
ow many direct links the individual involved in the choice option
as in the network (Freeman (1979) describes how the degree of a
ode is the most basic indicator of centrality, which in turn is the
ost basic social network measure). This is in line with qualitative
rocess theory, which suggests that human reasoning is more likely
o depend on qualitative rather than quantitative relations (Forbus,
993). Therefore, in our model we allow for individuals’ use of the
ype of action or individual as simpler heuristic cues in addition to
he precise expected payoff.
We hypothesize:
H1 (reduction of payoff orientation): Individuals’ network linking
choices are affected less strongly by their payoff consequences than
predicted by the classical payoff-based model (Section 2.1) in that
they are also systematically based on heuristic cues.
Pursuing the above line of reasoning, we formulate the experi-
nced utility that individual imay derive from choosing option jwith
he following heuristic cues:
i
j = f i(Payoff j,Complexity × (Payoff j, Formationj,Degree j)) + εij,
(1)
here Complexity is the network choice complexity that i is facing,
ormationj is a dummy variable indicating by zero that j involves re-
aining with the status quo and by one that it involves link dele-
ion or creation, Degreej is the number of direct links of an individual
ith whom i deletes or creates a link in j, and fi is a function increas-
ng in Payoffj and decreasing in the interaction of Complexity with
ayoffj. For the example of Fig. 1, this model predicts that from the
ve choice options allowed, “you” chooses one that seems to provide
erwith the highest payoff, which she partly bases on the simple cues
i) whether the option implies a deviation from the status quo (which
s the case for four options) and (ii) the degree of the node involved
n the option (which varies between zero and three among options)
ather than on the quantitative amount. Since several qualitative re-
ations exist between the heuristic cues and payoff, we do not predict
he signs of their net effects.
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t.2.2. Social preferences
The presence of social tradeoff is a further complicating factor in
he network setting, implying that an individual’s choices not only
ffect her own value, but also the value for her neighbors, her neigh-
ors’ neighbors, etc. (e.g., Bala & Goyal, 2000; Jackson & Wolinsky,
996). This aspect of network formation choices makes it more com-
lex for individuals with social preferences to judge the exact value of
ink choice options, because besides their own payoff they also have
o consider the payoff of other individuals.
We investigate whether individuals deal with the complexity of
ocial tradeoff by focusing on the payoff aspect that can be deter-
inedmost easily (Gigerenzer et al., 1999), that is, own payoff. There-
ore, we examine whether individuals tend to pay systematically less
ttention to others’ payoff due to the greater complexity of evaluat-
ng this social payoff. In the past, behavioral economists have found
mpirical evidence for social preferences. Recently, Falk and Kos-
eld (2012), Goeree et al. (2008), and van Dolder and Buskens (2014)
ound social motives in network formation, but this was in lab envi-
onments where choice complexity was largely mitigated by explicit
ayoff information, which directly presented participants with the
umerical payoff consequences for themselves as well as for others
f their choice options. We expect a smaller inﬂuence of payoff con-
equences for other individuals on choice when this is not the case.
bviously, since payoff for another individual is at least as opaque
s own payoff, we anticipate a baseline shift from payoff to heuris-
ic cues as predicted by H1 also for social payoff. However, we addi-
ionally expect a systematic heuristic shift from others’ to own payoff
hen complexity is not artiﬁcially removed. This shift may be both
ue to a concious shift of consideration from social to own payoff and
ue to an unintended stronger shift to the use of heuristic cues for
ocial payoff. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis:
H2 (reduction of social preferences): Individuals’ network linking
choices are affected less strongly by their payoff consequences for
other individuals than predicted by the classical payoff-based model
extended with social preferences (Section 2.1) in that complexity sys-
tematically reduces the impact of social payoff on these choices more
strongly than the impact of own payoff.
We include this heuristic effect in the experienced utility that in-
ividual i derives from choosing option j as follows:
i
j = f i
(
OwnPayoff j,
(
OthersPayoff
h
j
)
h =i
,Complexity
×
(
OwnPayoff j,
(
OthersPayoff
h
j
)
h =i
, Formationj,Degree j
))
,
(2)
here f i is a function decreasing in the interaction of Complexitywith
OthersPayoff hj )h =i. For the example of Fig. 1, this model predicts that
rom the ﬁve choice options allowed, “you” chooses one that seems to
ause her subjectively optimal combination of payoff for herself and
ayoff for the other individuals, where we expect the latter payoff to
et systematically less attention due to complexity.
.2.3. Reinforcing complexity conditions
Finally, we hypothesize that in addition to the baseline opacity
f choice consequences in this context due to the fact that network
xternalities have to be taken into account, two speciﬁc complexity
spects of networksmay strengthen individuals’ tendencies to switch
rom payoff to heuristic cues orientation and to reduce their social
references .
alue transferability. The ﬁrst network factor regarded here is value
ransferability, which refers to the fact that an individual derives
alue not only from her direct neighbors, but also indirectly from
er neighbors’ neighbors, etc. This network property makes it even
ore complex for individuals to judge the exact payoff of link choiceptions, because it requires additional cognitive work to be forward-
ooking over indirect links. This leads to the following hypotheses:
H3 (moderating effects of value transferability):
H3a: The presence of value transferability in a network decreases the
impact of payoff on an individual’s link formation choices in that it
systematically increases the impact of heuristic cues.
H3b: The presence of value transferability in a network decreases the
impact of others’ payoff on an individual’s link formation choices sys-
tematically more strongly than the impact of own payoff.
ocial tradeoff. Another complexity property we consider is social
radeoff, implying that an individual’s choices not only affect her own
alue, but also the value for her neighbors, her neighbors’ neighbors,
tc. (cf. Section 2.2.2). This network property makes it more complex
or individuals with social preferences to judge the exact value of link
hoice options, because besides their own payoff they have to con-
ider the payoff of (possibly many) other individuals, which requires
xtra cognitive effort. Therefore, the presence of social tradeoff will
ot only cause a shift of preferences from others’ to own payoff (H2),
ut we also expect it to have a strengthening effect on their shift from
ayoff to heuristic cues orientation. This can be formulated in the fol-
owing hypothesis:
H4 (moderating effect of social tradeoff): The presence of social trade-
off in a network decreases the impact of payoff on an individual’s
link formation choices in that it systematically increases the impact
of heuristic cues.
We include these moderating effects of complexity factors in the
xperienced utility that individual i derives from choosing option j as
ollows:
i
j = f i
(
OwnPayoff j,
(
OthersPayoff
h
j
)
h =i
,ComplexityCondition
×
(
OwnPayoff j,
(
OthersPayoff
h
j
)
h =i
, Formationj,Degree j
))
,
(3)
here ComplexityCondition is the network choice complexity condi-
ion that i is facing – concerning both the baseline opacity of choice
onsequences due to network externalities and the reinforcing com-
lexity of value transferability and social tradeoff – and fi is a function
n which the hypothesized interaction effects with ComplexityCondi-
ion are included. For the example of Fig. 1, this model predicts that
rom the ﬁve choice options allowed, “you” chooses one that seems to
ause her subjectively optimal combination of payoff for herself and
ayoff for the other individuals, which systematically varies with the
omplexity condition.
. Methods
In this section we describe the experimental design as well as the
arametric approach used for testing our hypotheses.
.1. Experimental design
Our experiment presented participants with six network forma-
ion link choice problems similar to that in Fig. 1. In these problems
participant was allowed to change at most one direct link, that is,
o delete a link that already exists between her and another individ-
al, to create a link between her and another individual if there is not
et one, or to change nothing. The choice problems are illustrated in
ables A.1 (1–3) and A.2 (4–6), Appendix A. They were created such
hat they represent a variety of network linking decisions while en-
bling mutual comparison. The number of individuals as well as the
otal number of links was kept constant in all six choice problems.
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Table 1
Experimental design.
Social tradeoff
NO YES
Value NO none social (part 1, part 2)
transferability YES transfer both (part 1, part 2)
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aPilot studies conducted by the authors before the experiment indi-
cated that most other structural complexity factors like the number
of visual crossings between links did not affect participants’ choices.
An exception was whether the decision maker was connected to the
rest of the network at the moment of choice or not. Therefore, three
of the six choice problems involved a connected position and the
other three an isolated position for the participant. Furthermore, to
avoid unanticipated biases due to other structural factors, the order
of choice problems was rotated among participants.
To test for the hypothesized shifts in behavior due to value trans-
ferability and social tradeoff, we employed four experimental treat-
ments where these two characteristics were between-subjects fac-
tors. Thus, each participant faced one of four particular complexity
conditions (see Section 2.2.3). The experimental design is summa-
rized in Table 1. Parts 1 and 2 for the treatments social and both refer
to a within-subject manipulation that will be discussed later in this
section.
Each participant was confronted with a payoff function matching
her treatment. This function reﬂects the beneﬁts and costs of link for-
mation according to a typical situation in communication networks
with high cost of link speciﬁcity as modeled by Harmsen - van Hout
et al. (2013). The more direct connections an individual has to main-
tainwith other individuals, the less she is able to specify her attention
per link. Therefore, her value per link for others declines and she also
derives less value from each link with others. Two connected agents
contribute to their bilateral process of communication value creation
according to a standard Cobb–Douglas production function with as
inputs the amount of time invested by each agent in the link. High
link speciﬁcity implies unit output elasticities in each bilateral value
production process and therefore low advantage of being connected
with several others. The respective payoff function was explained in
words to the participants in the instructions.
For a participant i in treatment none or social there was no value
transferability, so value was derived from direct neighbors only. This
reﬂects a situationwhere social value is derived from communication
(Harmsen - van Hout et al., 2013). The payoff function was then given
by:
Πi =
⎧⎨
⎩
∑
j∈Ni
1
μiμ j
if μi > 0
0 if μi = 0,
where Ni is the set of individuals with whom i has a direct link, in-
dividual j is a neighbor of i if j ∈ Ni, and μi = |Ni| is the number of
neighbors of i, that is, the degree of i. In the instructions, this pay-
off function was presented by the following elementary verbal de-
scription: “For each node you are directly linked with (we call such a
node a neighbour) you obtain points. However, there is also some cost
associated with being connected: the number of points you receive
for each of your direct neighbours equals 10 divided by two com-
ponents: (i) the number of direct neighbours you have, and (ii) the
number of direct neighbours this neighbour has”, supplementedwith
an elaborated numerical example (see the Supplementary material,
Appendix C).
For treatments transfer and both there was value transferability,
so value was derived from direct as well as indirectly connected indi-
viduals. This reﬂects a situation where informational value is derived
from communication (Harmsen - van Hout et al., 2013). The payoff
function was then given by:i =
⎧⎨
⎩
∑
j∈N¯i
∑
p∈Pi, j
1
μiμ j
∏
k∈p˘
(μk)2
if μi > 0
0 if μi = 0,
here N¯i is the set of individuals with whom i has either a direct or
n indirect link, Pi, j is the set of paths between i and j, where a path
s deﬁned as a sequence of consecutive links without repeated indi-
iduals, p˘ is the set of individuals on path p between i and j excluding
and j themselves, and μi is the degree of i. In the instructions, this
ayoff function was formulated as “For each path that links you to
ome other node you obtain points. However, there is also some cost
ssociated with being connected: the number of points you receive
or each path that links you to some other node equals 10 divided by
hree components: (i) the number of direct neighbours you have in
he network, (ii) the number of direct neighbours this other node has
n the network, and (iii) the square of the number of direct neigh-
ours that any of the further nodes on the path between you and the
ther node has in the network” and illustrated by an example (see the
upplementary material, Appendix C).
For treatments none and transfer there was no social tradeoff. The
articipants were informed that nobody else was affected by their
hoices. For treatments social and both there was social tradeoff. The
articipants were informed that the other individuals in the choice
roblems were not reﬂecting real people with the ability to inﬂu-
nce their payoff, that the payoff their choices generated for these
ctive individuals were determined analogously to their own payoff,
nd that the total payoff their choices generated for these ﬁctive indi-
iduals would be divided equally among the other participants in the
oom. Thus, a simple form of social preferences, not involving distri-
utional issues, was evoked.
It can be checked that the six choice problems introduced above
re selected such that they each provide the opportunity to explic-
tly reveal social preferences in both the treatments with andwithout
alue transferability. For example, in choice problem 5 (as visualized
ith options’ respective payoffs in Table 2), in the treatments with-
ut value transferability, participants can exhibit social preferences in
he sense that while keeping their own payoff at its maximum they
an choose better or worse for the others (e.g., by selecting option d
ersus option c), and in the treatments with value transferability, par-
icipants can exhibit social preferences in the sense that by giving up
ome of their own payoff they can improve the payoff for others (e.g.,
gain by selecting option d versus option c). The payoffs for the other
hoice problems are given in Table A.3 in Appendix A. No informa-
ion or feedback about the tasks and choices of the other participants
as provided during the experiment in order to ensure that strategic
otivations are absent.
To control for individual differences in social preferences, for par-
icipants in treatments social and both where payoff for other par-
icipants had to be considered, an additional part was added to the
xperiment. This was exactly the same as the ﬁrst part, but for each
hoice option the payoff for the participant as well as for the oth-
rs was mentioned explicitly. This is illustrated in Fig. 2. Charness,
réchette, and Kagel (2004) and Gürerk and Selten (2012) showed
hat providing participants with such a comprehensive payoff table
s an effective way to systematically reduce complexity. The objective
f this extra manipulation was to test in how far participants take
thers’ payoff into account when the complexity of doing so is prac-
ically removed. Thus, for the treatments social and both, whether or
ot numerical payoff information was provided was incorporated as
within-subjects factor. Note that for the treatments without social
radeoff, it is obvious that participants would always choose opti-
ally when provided with a payoff overview, so we do not bother
hem with such a second part.
The experiment took place in a computer lab with students
nd employees of various faculties of Maastricht University, the
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Table 2
Payoffs choice problem 5.
Value transferability NO Value transferability YES
you others you others
nothing 5 41.67 nothing 6.39 47.5
a 0 40 a 0 46.67
b 5 31.67 b 6.94 40.45
c 5 31.67 c 6.94 40.45
d 5 38.33 d 6.25 44.17
e 3.75 36.25 e 5 40.94
f 5 38.33 f 6.25 44.17
Fig. 2. Illustration payoff information.
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tetherlands. The 48 male and 66 female participants from diverse
ationalities were randomly assigned to the four between-subject
reatments. Thus, the number of independent observations is larger
han common in the existing experimental network formation liter-
ture, e.g., Di Cagno and Sciubba (2010) run only six sessions (with
ix interdependent participants each) per treatment. Participants
ere informed how the payoffs they would earn in the experiment
ould be converted into cash euros afterwards, see the Supplemen-
ary material (Appendix C) for details. After each choice, feedback
as given to the participant about the payoff she earned for her-
elf and if relevant for the other participants in the room, and the
espective maximum and minimum payoffs that could have been
arned in the speciﬁc choice problem. Participants could only start
he experiment after answering a number of control questions cor-
ectly to make sure the instructions were understood correctly and
fter two really paid-out practice rounds with only three choice op-
ions, see Table A.4, Appendix A. Our pilot experiments already in-
reasingly conﬁrmed that the instructions were generally understood
fter working through the example. At the end of the experiment
articipants were asked to comment on their motives and the way
hey made their choices in a debrieﬁng part. Average earnings were
6.03.
.2. Mixed logit estimation
We perform a comprehensive parametric test of our hypotheses
y estimating amixed (i.e., randomparameters) logitmodel (Hensher
t al., 2005). This estimation approach enables us to establish the
oles of several attributes of link options in the network formation
rocess, while allowing for heterogeneity across individuals. The to-
al potential experienced utility that individual i under treatment t
erives from choosing option j in choice problem c is affected by both
ayoff and other factors as well as the complexity treatment she is
acing, and is formalized as follows:ti
c j =
∑
k∈K
β ikP
t
kc j +
∑
m∈M
γ imCmc j +
∑
k∈K
ϕkT
tPtkc j +
∑
m∈M
χmT
tCmc j
+ θStPt1c j +
∑
m∈M
ξmS
tCmc j + ζTtStPt1c j +
∑
m∈M
ηmT
tStCmc j
+
∑
k∈K
ψ1kI
t
cP
t
kc j +
∑
m∈M
ψ2mI
t
cCmc j +
∑
k∈K
ψ3kI
t
cT
tPtkc j
+
∑
m∈M
ψ4mI
t
cT
tCmc j + εtic j,
here
K is the set of payoff indices {1, 2},
Pt
1c j
is the own payoff generated under t when in c she
chooses j,
Pt
2c j
is the payoff generated for the other participants,
M is the set of decision cue indices {1, 2},
C1cj is a cue dummy variable indicating deviation from the sta-
tus quo,
C2cj is a cue variable indicating the number of direct links of an
individual with whom a link is deleted or created,
Tt is a dummy variable indicating the presence of value trans-
ferability, that is, treatment transfer or both,
St is a dummy variable indicating the presence of social trade-
off, that is, treatment social or both,
Itc is a dummy variable indicating the presence of numerical
payoff information (within-subject manipulation), and
εti
c j
is a stochastic variable drawn from a standard Gumbel
distribution.
otice that interactions between S and P2 or between S, T and P2 do
ot provide additional information to P2 or the interaction between
and P2 respectively and therefore are not included, and that inter-
ctions including both I and S do not provide additional information
o interactions only including S and therefore are not incorporated
ither. Interactions among payoff and decision cue factors (e.g., be-
ween P and C ) are not included due to lack of interpretability.1 2
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Table 3
Descriptive results choice problem 5.
none transfer
Choice % Choice %
nothing 43.3 nothing 17.9
a 0.0 a 0.0
b 40.0 b 60.7
c 10.0 c 7.1
d 3.3 d 0.0
e 0.0 e 3.6
f 3.3 f 10.7
social / payoff info NO social / payoff info YES
Choice % Choice %
nothing 10.7 nothing 53.6
a 0.0 a 0.0
b 39.3 b 21.4
c 7.1 c 7.1
d 17.9 d 7.1
e 0.0 e 3.6
f 25.0 f 7.1
both / payoff info NO both / payoff info YES
Choice % Choice %
nothing 35.7 nothing 25.0
a 0.0 a 0.0
b 28.6 b 46.4
c 14.3 c 25.0
d 7.1 d 3.6
e 7.1 e 0.0
f 7.1 f 0.0
Table 4
Optimal choice in the complexity treatments.
Social tradeoff
NO YES, without YES, with
payoff info payoff info
Value NO 97% 89% 96%
transferability YES 47% 45% 78%
Table 5
Social preferences in the complexity treatments.
Social tradeoff
YES, without payoff info YES, with payoff info
NO max others | max own 27% max others | max own 58%
Value Pareto inferior 11% Pareto inferior 4%
transferability YES max others | max own 39% max others | max own 73%
Pareto inferior 30% Pareto inferior 7%
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vIn random parameter β i
k
, superscript i allows for heterogeneity
due to individuals’ personal preferences as follows:
β ik = βk + ν ik,
where ν i
k
is a stochastic variable drawn from a normal distribution.
Analogously, random parameters are included for the baseline effects
of the decision cue variables on choice (γ im).
Then, under the usual assumptions, the unconditional probabil-
ity that individual i will choose option j equals the expected value of
the logit probability over all possible values of the random param-
eters. Given the nature of our experimental design as described in
Section 3.1, complete orthogonality of all regressors in the logitmodel
is not possible, but all correlations between payoffs and heuristic cues
as well as between own and others’ payoffs are below 0.31. Themodel
is estimated by Maximum Likelihood with NLOGIT 5.0, Econometric
Software, Inc., implementing 1000 Halton draws in the Monte Carlo
simulation.
4. Results
4.1. Illustrative descriptive results
Before turning to a more formal analysis, we ﬁrst present some
illustrative results for the choices made in the different treatments.
Hereby the focus is ﬁrst on choice problem 5 (Table 2), of which
Table 3 gives the choice percentages in the different treatments.
In treatment none (ﬁrst row Table 3), without value transferability
and social tradeoff, all participants choose one of the optimal options,
that is, nothing, b, c, d, or f. However, in treatment transfer, where
value transferability is included, only 67.8% of the respective partici-
pants chooses one of the optimal options, that is, b or c. This is in line
with H3a. Comparing none to transfer, the percentage of participants
choosing to maintain the status quo decreases from 43.3 to 17.9, and
linking to b, which has a degree of one only, becomes evenmore pop-
ular. This complies with the heuristic cues introduced in Section 2.2.1
for H1.In treatment social (second row Table 3), where social tradeoff is
ncluded, while keeping own payoff optimal, one can maximize the
ayoff for others by choosing to change nothing. Only 10.7% of the re-
pective participants turns out to opt for this, though all these partici-
ants still maximize their own payoff, that is, select option nothing, b,
, d, or f. However, in the second part of the experiment, when payoff
nformation is given, thus eliminating complexity, 53.6% of the same
articipants prefers this option. This pattern corresponds to H2. Note
hat changing nothing maintains the status quo, which again relates
o one of the heuristic cues.
In treatment both (third row Table 3), with both value transfer-
bility and social tradeoff, only 42.9% of the respective participants
hooses one of the options with optimal own payoff, that is, b or c,
hereas the rest seems to be willing to give up some of their own
ayoff in order to improve the payoff for others. Note that 21.3% even
hooses a Pareto inferior option, that is, a, d, e, or f. However, in the
econd part of the experiment, when payoff information is given, thus
liminating complexity, the proportion with optimal own payoff in-
reases to 71.4%. Also, only 3.6% chooses a Pareto inferior option. This
esult is in line with H4. Notice that the option to link to e, which has
he relatively high degree of three, remains impopular in all treat-
ents, which is in accordance with one of the heuristic cues once
ore.
In Table 4 an overview across all choice problems is provided of
ow often participants choose optimally in the different treatments
nd in Table 5 of how often participants maximized other partici-
ants’ payoff given own maximal payoff and how often they choose
Pareto inferior option in the sense that both own and others’ payoff
ould be strictly improved by choosing a different option. The tables
onﬁrm that participants weremore effective in optimization the less
omplex the treatment.
In Table 6 we count frequencies of how often participants re-
ained with the status quo in the three choice problems where the
ecision maker is not isolated, as in the three choice problems with
n isolated start position, remaining with the status quo is consis-
ently very bad for payoff and was chosen accordingly rarely in all
reatments. Prominent differences appear in the treatments with so-
ial tradeoff: in social without payoff information, the percentage of
tatus quo choices is considerably lower than in social with payoff
nformation (and even lower than when each of the seven choice op-
ions would have been chosen with equal probability), whereas in
othwithout payoff information, the percentage of status quo choices
s considerably higher than in bothwith payoff information. In Table 7
he average degree of the nodes involved in the chosen options across
ll problems is listed. With random choice, the average degree would
e 1.31, and with a random selection of one of the options that pro-
ide optimal own payoff, the average degree would be 0.98 and 1.06
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Table 6
Remaining with the connected status quo in the complexity treatments.
Social tradeoff
NO YES, without YES, with
payoff info payoff info
Value NO 24% 11% 36%
transferability YES 21% 24% 14%
Table 7
Average degree of the nodes involved in the chosen options in the complexity treat-
ments.
Social tradeoff
NO YES, without YES, with
payoff info payoff info
Value NO 0.83 0.96 0.90
transferability YES 1.36 1.26 1.00
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oithout and with value transferability respectively. Thus, in treat-
ent none participants over-selected low-degree options and in the
reatments with value transferability (and no payoff overview) par-
icipants over-selected high-degree options.
The above crosstab results are in line with our hypotheses, but
annot be interpreted as direct evidence, since alternative explana-
ions for differences between choice frequencies in the treatments
re possible. For example, it could be that all differences in complex-
ty just lead to differences in choice precision, implying that allow-
ng for conditional random error terms in network formation mod-
ling would be suﬃcient, whereas we hypothesize more systematic
hanges in decision making. Also, even though we restricted our fo-
us to the very simple setting of a static, non-strategic network in
hich the decision maker can choose to create or delete one link or
o do nothing, it could be that confounding effects play a role, for
nstance, the exact payoffs in the treatments with value transferabil-
ty are by deﬁnition different from those in the treatments without
although the order of magnitude of these differences is relatively
mall). In the mixed logit approach in the next section these alterna-
ive explanations can be accounted for. Namely, confounding effects
re dealt with by the comprehensiveness of the model itself, where
or example both exact payoffs and simple heuristic cues are included
s explanatory variables. Explicit comparison to shifts in randomness
s made in the last robustness check of Section 4.2.2.Table 8
Mixed logit estimations.
Variable Parameter
own payoff β i1
others’ payoff β i2
formation γ i1
degree γ i2
transferability ∗ own payoff ϕ1
transferability ∗ others’ payoff ϕ3
transferability ∗ formation χ1
transferability ∗ degree χ2
social tradeoff ∗ own payoff θ1
social tradeoff ∗ formation ξ 1
social tradeoff ∗ degree ξ 2
transferability ∗ social tradeoff ∗ own payoff ζ
transferability ∗ social tradeoff ∗ formation η1
transferability ∗ social tradeoff ∗ degree η2
payoff info ∗ own payoff ψ11
payoff info ∗ others’ payoff ψ12
payoff info ∗ formation ψ21
payoff info ∗ degree ψ22
payoff info ∗ transferability ∗ own payoff ψ31
payoff info ∗ transferability ∗ others’ payoff ψ32
payoff info ∗ transferability ∗ formation ψ41
payoff info ∗ transferability ∗ degree ψ42Notice that we did not hypothesize that the payoff derived from
euristic network linking decisions would be far from optimal. In
act, across all choice problems, participants earned a fraction of 0.9
rom the own payoffs they could have earned in the treatments social
art 1, transfer, and both part 1, and even 0.99 in the treatment none,
hereas pure random selection would only have led to a proportion
f 0.8 from the own payoffs that could have been earned. So in that
ense, if heuristics were used, they may be considered rather “smart”
cf. Gigerenzer et al., 1999).
Further descriptive results, primarily from the debrieﬁng part, are
iven in Appendix B.
.2. Mixed logit results
A comprehensive parametric test of the hypotheses is con-
ucted by estimating a mixed logit model across all treatments
Section 4.2.1). A p-value of 0.05 is taken as cut-off value for signif-
cance. In Section 4.2.2 several robustness checks are performed.
.2.1. Hypothesized model
The estimation results for all experimental treatments including
he interaction effects of an explicit payoff overview are given in
able 8.
In these results we ﬁnd support for the reduction of payoff ori-
ntation in this complex setting (H1), since besides the own payoff,
he degree of the individual involved in the choice option appears
o be signiﬁcantly inﬂuential on a linking decision, where individu-
ls with many links are avoided in comparison with relatively iso-
ated individuals (negative γ i
2
). This might be based on the qualita-
ive notion that maintaining links is costly. For the treatments with
ocial payoff, where the within-subjects factor of numerical payoff
nformation was included, this is reconﬁrmed by the positively sig-
iﬁcant ψ11-coeﬃcient, indicating that when participants were pro-
ided with such a comprehensive payoff overview, the impact of pay-
ff on their linking choices increased.
With respect to the expected reduction of social preferences in the
etwork formation context (H2), we ﬁnd strong conﬁrmation as the
i
2
-coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant at all, whereas in the situation where
articipants were provided with numerical payoff information, the
orresponding coeﬃcient (ψ12) is positively signiﬁcant, showing that
he same individuals weremorewilling to consider the consequences
f their choices for others than they actually did in the ﬁrst roundEstimated mean Estimated stand. Cf. hypothesis
(p-value) dev. (p-value)
1.814 (0.000) 0.476 (0.000)
−0.014 (0.732) 0.135 (0.000) 2
0.501 (0.232) 1.023 (0.000) 1
−0.848 (0.000) 0.165 (0.252) 1
−1.075 (0.002) 3
−0.022 (0.689) 3
−1.456 (0.012) 3
1.500 (0.000) 3
−1.133 (0.001) 4
1.444 (0.039) 4
−0.117 (0.723) 4
1.261 (0.002)
−1.450 (0.117)
0.034 (0.930)
0.872 (0.002) 1
0.136 (0.004) 2
−1.992 (0.009)
0.477 (0.196)
0.518 (0.201)
−0.098 (0.159)
3.136 (0.002)
−0.983 (0.044)
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Table 9
Summary experimental results.
Hypothesis Result
Heuristic effects of complexity on linking choice
H1: reduction of payoff supported (low degree as heuristic cue in baseline)
orientation
H2: reduction of social supported (numerical payoff necessary to consider
preferences other individuals’ payoff at all)
Moderating effects of speciﬁc complexity factors
H3: value transferability supported for reduction of payoff orientation (high
degree and remaining with status quo as heuristic
cues); social preferences could not be further
reduced
H4: social tradeoff supported (deviating from status quo as heuristic
cue)
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fof the experiment. Also, this effect is stronger than for own payoff,
since in the treatments with social tradeoff, exact own payoff is still
considered, as |θ1| < β i1.
The hypothesized moderating effects of value transferability are
supported with respect to the reduction of payoff orientation (H3a):
the ϕ1-coeﬃcient of the payoff interaction term turns out to be nega-
tively signiﬁcant. We see that instead, participants stuck signiﬁcantly
more to the status quo (negative χ1) and reversed their preference
for isolated versus central individuals (χ2). The former might be sub-
scribed to the fact that it is now more complex to calculate what it
brings to deviate from already satisfying situations, whereas the lat-
ter might be due to the qualitative notion that since value is now
transferable over indirect links, having more links is more beneﬁcial.
Since others’ payoff were already completely ignored in the choices of
the participants, it is no longer possible for the additional complexity
factor value transferability to signiﬁcantly decrease their effect (H3b).
The hypothesized moderating effect of social tradeoff on payoff
orientation (H4) is corroborated as well, for the θ1-coeﬃcient is also
signiﬁcantly negative. Here, respondents had the tendency to deviate
from the status quo (positive ξ 1). This overactivity might be related
to the fact that it is complex to calculate whether situations satisfy-
ing with respect to own payoff will be also beneﬁcial for the others
now involved, which suggests that some latent social motives are still
present, but the situation is too complex to deal with them like in the
less complex part with direct payoff information.
Finally, respondents’ behavior signiﬁcantly varies among partic-
ipants in several respects as can be concluded from the signiﬁcant
random parameter standard deviations in the next to last column of
Table 8.
4.2.2. Robustness
In this section, we checkwhether our estimation results are robust
for several control variables.
Order effects. The model is re-estimated where additionally inter-
action terms are included of each of the four main variables (i.e.
those with a random parameter) with a control variable tracking
the position of the respective option in the list of choice options,
to check for robustness against order effects. We ﬁnd one small but
signiﬁcant order effect: the interaction effect of others’ payoff with
the order variable is 0.004 (0.005), indicating that others’ payoff be-
comes systematically slightly more relevant for lower-listed choice
options. Importantly, almost all previously found heuristic effects re-
main. The single exception is the positive interaction effect of so-
cial tradeoff with formation (ξ 1), which becomes insigniﬁcant now
(p-value 0.202). However, the interaction effect of social tradeoff and
own payoff (θ1) remains signiﬁcantly negative, indicating thatH4 still
holds, but suggesting that there is a shift to some heuristic cue left
unidentiﬁed in the current pioneering model.
Learning effects. Themodel is re-estimated for the ﬁrst part of the ex-
periment only (without numerical payoff information) – for the sec-
ond part of the experiment, when payoff tables are provided to the
same participants, it is not straightforward how to extend the deﬁni-
tion of the experience variable –where additionally interaction terms
are included of each of the four main variables with a control variable
measuring experience by tracking how many problems the partici-
pant already solved at the respective moment of choice, to check for
robustness against learning effects. We ﬁnd that almost all previously
found heuristic effects remain, with the same exception as at the ro-
bustness check against order effects described above. It turns out that
more experienced individuals have a signiﬁcantly stronger tendency
to avoid individuals with many links, so the heuristic effects in net-
work formation decisions as explored in the current paper are deﬁ-
nitely not transitory.andom shift effects. Finally, we compare our model to a more re-
tricted model where instead of including the speciﬁc interaction ef-
ects for the treatments, we only allow the variance of the error term
o linearly depend on them, to check whether differences among
reatments as predicted by H2 through H4 are possibly merely due
o shifts in choice precision (Salisbury & Feinberg, 2010), so whether
ore complexity only leads to more randomness. This rival model
urns out to perform signiﬁcantly worse in terms of model ﬁt (the
oglikelihood decreases from −1540.872 to −1647.825), strengthen-
ng our claim of more systematic effects of complexity on link choice
ehavior.
. Discussion
.1. Conclusions
A concise summary of our results is given in Table 9.
The hypothesis that individuals’ network linking choices are af-
ected less strongly by their payoff consequences than predicted by
he classical payoff-based model (H1) is supported by the mixed logit
stimation of Section 4.2.1, as it indicates that these choices are also
ased on heuristic cues. Already in the baseline treatment where
ayoffs are obscured due to network externalities, a lower degree of
he node involved in the option signiﬁcantly explains choice whereas
he exact payoff was also included as an explanatory variable. In the
reatments with value transferability, higher degrees become signif-
cantly more attractive and remaining with the status quo becomes
n additional heuristic cue. In the treatments with social tradeoff, we
ven ﬁnd a reverse status quo bias, which is quite unique in the lit-
rature (cf. Mengel, 2011), but this requires further research as it is
ot robust against order and learning effects. These results are also
eﬂected in the descriptive Tables 6 and 7 in Section 4.1.
The hypothesis that individuals’ network linking choices are af-
ected less strongly by their payoff consequences for other individuals
han predicted by the classical payoff-basedmodel extendedwith so-
ial preferences due to a systematic shift of motivation from social to
wn payoff (H2) is strongly supported by the mixed logit estimation,
s it indicates that these choices do not merely become more socially
otivated when the complexity is largely removed by a comprehen-
ive payoff overview (as reﬂected in descriptive Table 5 in Section 4.1),
ut they are even not socially motivated at all without such a numer-
cal table. Indeed, the impact of own payoff on choices does not suffer
o this extent from the same level of complexity. Note that some re-
pondent answers in the debrieﬁng part of the experiment suggest
hat this shift of the impact from social to own payoff as a conse-
uence of social tradeoff is partly due to a concious shift of consider-
tion away from social payoff (Appendix B, item 5). Our explanation
f the reverse status quo bias in Section 4.2.1 suggests that it is also
artly due to an unintended stronger shift to the use of heuristic cues
or social payoff.
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AThe hypothesized moderating effects of the complexity factors
alue transferability and social tradeoff (H3, H4) are also supported
y the mixed logit estimation, as their presence further decreases the
mpact of payoff on an individual’s link formation choices, which is
lso reﬂected in descriptive Table 4 in Section 4.1.
Thus, this study shows that complexity in the network formation
etting inﬂuences individual link choice behavior in a systematic way,
ince individuals’ choices are guided less by payoff, where the at-
ention appears to be shifted to factors only qualitatively related to
ayoff, and moreover, this effect is stronger for social payoff than for
wn payoff. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the speciﬁc complex-
ty factors value transferability and social tradeoff aggravate the for-
er effect. In Section 4.2.2 (Random shift effects) it was conﬁrmed
hat these changes in behavior cannot accurately be captured by a
odel only allowing for differences in choice precision (or random-
ess) among complexity treatments.
.2. Implications
The current study initiates empirical research into the is-
ue of heuristic effects in individual decisions of network for-
ation. Our results should raise interest in future research into
his realm, for they have important implications for theoretical
nd experimental research as well as application areas of network
ormation.
Our results show that behavioral effects play a crucial role in the
rocess of decentral network formation. Therefore, theoretical OR
odels of network creation (e.g., Baron et al., 2006; Demaine et al.,
012; Fabrikant et al., 2003; Harmsen - van Hout et al., 2013; Hell-
ann & Staudigl, 2014; Janssen & Monsuur, 2012; Monsuur, 2007;
laizola & Valenciano, 2014) should take such effects into consid-
ration. In particular, the current experiment was based on payoff
unctions used in Harmsen - van Hout et al. to model communica-
ion network formation with high link speciﬁcity. This kind of mod-
ls should not only allow for random error to become more realistic,
ut should explicitly include human tendencies as found by our anal-
sis to base complex linking decisions on heuristic cues like status
uo and node degree rather than exact payoff. As seen in Section 4.1
the consequences for payoffs in the simplest setting may not be
ery high, but it may very well be expected that the structural and
ﬃciency predictions and therefore recommendations for interven-
ions resulting from these more complex models differ largely if their
gents are no longer optimizing but consider much simpler decision
ues instead (cf. Hämäläinen et al., 2013). For example, the model
ith high link speciﬁcity by Harmsen - van Hout et al. predicted a
ide range of networks in situations without value transferability,
ncluding non-standard networks like highly connected and “small
orld” networks, and highly fragmented, eﬃcient networks in situa-
ions with value transferability. Similarly, predictions were made for
ther levels of link speciﬁcity and several recommendations for net-
ork moderation were based hereupon. It should be investigated in
ow far these still holdwith agents behaving heuristically rather than
urely optimizing.
On the other hand, our results suggest that the existent network
ormation models are already correct in not taking social preferences
nto account, for though previous laboratory research indicated that
eople do have them, we show that the complex decision environ-
ent keeps them from being revealed.
Furthermore, experimental research practice is often disposed to
ake the payoff consequences of choices as transparent as possible
or participants to prevent biased ﬁndings due to their wrong under-
tanding of the instructions. However, we claim that this explicit in-
ormation modiﬁes participants’ behavior in a systematic way, since
t eliminates complexity that they otherwise would handle by heuris-
ic shifts.Finally, in many contexts of network formation among individu-
ls such as job opportunities (e.g., Granovetter, 1995) and mortal-
ty (e.g., Berkman & Syme, 1979), it matters to be aware of heuris-
ic effects as found in this study. For example, with word-of-mouth
ommunications among consumers (e.g., Iacobucci & Hopkins, 1992),
or the supplier of the respective product or service it is interesting
o know when consumers have a tendency to talk with isolated or
entral peers and that they neglect beneﬁts that peers derive from
heir communication decisions. Also, suppliers can exploit the ﬁnd-
ng that this behavior is dependent on the complexity of the network
nvironment, for example, by facilitating information about social
ayoffs.
.3. Future research
Diverse linear transformations to convert points earned to euro
ayments – which we used over complexity conditions to equal-
ze the average monetary rewards with which our participants leave
he laboratory – might inﬂuence decisions (Maddox, Bohil, & Dodd,
003). Although we think it unlikely that participants in our experi-
ent were able to comprehend more than the fact that earning more
oints would increase their ultimate monetary payoff as well (see the
upplementarymaterial, Appendix C), further work could account for
his in another way.
In order to prevent interference of complexity types that are not
he focus of the current research, we studied a relatively simple net-
ork linking decision that is only one-shot and involves only one
ctive participant changing at most one link. Also, the payoff infor-
ation is complete and certain. Future research could study whether
nd in how far additional (and often previously studied) complex-
ty types such as strategic interaction, dynamics, multi-link deviation,
ncomplete information, and uncertainty strengthen the heuristic ef-
ects shown by the current paper.
Furthermore, in this pioneering study we could ﬁnd signiﬁcant
hifts from exact payoff to the descriptive attributes qualitatively re-
ated to it that to the best of our knowledge can be determined most
asily by a decision maker, namely remaining with versus deviating
rom the status quo and the degree centrality of a node. Issues like
ognitive distinctions between deleting and creating a link or be-
ween connectedness and disconnectedness of the decision maker
ould be considered in future work, as well as decision cues based on
ore advanced centrality or other social network measures, e.g., the
umber of nodes reached at a distance of two. Similarly, follow-up
xperiments could investigate the effects of demographics and other
ackground variables as collected in Appendix B if explicitly designed
o do so.
Another direction that future studies could take concerns the
uestion in how far the complexity types and heuristic effects we
onsidered are speciﬁc for the network context. For example, in
ow far does complexity systematically reduce social preferences in
ther choice settings? Moreover, further experiments could generate
eeper insights in the linking choice process of individuals by concen-
rating on speciﬁc effects from the rich range of heuristic tendencies
xplored here.
cknowledgments
The authors gratefully acknowledge two anonymous referees for
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Table A.1
Choice problems 1–3.
Table A.2
Choice problems 4–6.
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Table A.3
Payoffs choice problems 1–4 and 6.
Value transferability NO Value transferability YES
1 you others you others
nothing 6.67 26.67 nothing 8.33 32.92
a 5 25 a 7.5 30.31
b 7.5 37.5 b 8.75 42.5
c 6.25 21.25 c 7.5 26.48
d 7.5 27.5 d 8.75 34.45
e 6.25 21.25 e 7.5 26.48
f 7.5 37.5 f 8.75 42.5
2 you others you others
nothing 0 33.33 nothing 0 41.25
a 5 33.33 a 6.58 41.51
b 3.33 32.22 b 5.03 39.72
c 5 33.33 c 6.58 41.51
d 5 35 d 6.25 42.5
e 2.5 32.5 e 4.06 39.14
f 3.33 32.22 f 5.03 39.72
3 you others you others
nothing 5 45 nothing 6.72 51.09
a 0 45 a 0 51.25
b 5 35 b 7.11 44
c 5 35 c 7.11 44
d 5 40 d 6.64 46.56
e 4.17 39.17 e 5.83 44.58
f 4.17 40.83 f 5.38 45.59
4 you others you others
nothing 0 27.5 nothing 0 35.31
a 5 30 a 6.05 37.15
b 2 26 b 3.5 32.7
c 5 30 c 6.05 37.15
d 5 27.5 d 6.52 35.74
e 3.33 26.67 e 4.93 34.24
f 5 30 f 6.05 37.15
6 you others you others
nothing 0 38.33 nothing 0 43.33
a 3.33 38.89 a 4.57 43.58
b 2.5 37.5 b 3.91 42.03
c 5 40 c 6.18 44.79
d 5 33.33 d 7.5 40.83
e 5 33.33 e 7.5 40.83
f 3.33 38.89 f 4.57 43.58
ATable A.4
Practice rounds.ppendix B. Descriptive results
1. Duration: average 40.2 minutes, stand. dev. 14.8 minutes.
2. Almost all participants tried to earn as much as possible,
whereas 17 subjects indicated other goals: best choices (6),
fun/interest (2), optimal own payoffs and not too bad payoffs
for the others (4), optimal own payoffs andminimal payoffs for
the others (1), structural goals (4).
3. In the ﬁrst choice problem (practice round), participants chose
as follows: at random: 1, by calculation: 60, by intuition: 34,
using a rule: 13, namely connect to the one with the least
neighbors/shortest paths (13), otherwise: 6, namely mix of in-
tuition and calculation (5), mistake in understanding instruc-
tions at ﬁrst (1).
4. Thereafter, did participants change their strategies? No: 67,
for the strategy was good or convenient and the problems
were similar, yes: 47, switch (more) to calculation (12), intu-
ition/experience (22), or rule mentioned in descriptive 3. (11),
or consider other participants more (2).
5. In conditions social and both, did participants take into account
the points created for other participants? 36 did not, since they
didn’t think about it (4), didn’t care about it (16), didn’t know
how (5) or didn’t like the effort (11), 20 did, where they (condi-
tionally)maximized (≥ 8) orminimized (≥ 3) the points for the
others, two participants seem not to understand that dividing
among other participants does not include yourself.
6. Strategies in the second part (with numerical payoff informa-
tion) of conditions social and both: (conditionally) maximizing
payoffs for the others (25), choosing not too badly for the oth-
ers (7), (conditionally) minimizing payoffs for the others (6),
trying to repeat ﬁrst part (8), unclear (10).
7. Strategic considerations in conditions social and both? No: 18,
since they didn’t think about it (7), thought that the other par-
ticipants wouldn’t care (5), the other participants are outside
control (4), or it would be too diﬃcult (2), yes, but did not in-
ﬂuence choices: 9, yes, hoping for a favorable group: 5, or ex-
pecting an unfavorable group: 2, yes, unclear how: 22 (at least
ﬁve of these seem not to understand that this question is about
the others creating points for you and not about you creating
points for the others).
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S
S
S
S
S
T
V
W8. Diﬃculties were mentioned in the following ﬁelds: calcula-
tion: 33, choice complexity: 35, instructions: 26, equivalent
options: 5, none: 16.
9. Further remarks: interesting/nice: 12, want to know more
about the experiment: 10, conﬁrming what was said before:
5, suggestions: 10.
10. Age: average 22.5 years, stand. dev.: 3.4 years.
11. Males: 48, females: 66.
12. Dutch: 40, German: 43, Chinese: 9, other: 22.
13. Faculty of Economics & Business Administration: 90, other: 24.
14. 90 participants did not participate in a similar experiment be-
fore; 24 did.
15. 112 participants would like to participate in future experi-
ments, two would not.
16. In conditions social and both: 40 participants did not know any
of their fellow session participants, 12 knew one and four knew
more.
Appendix C. Supplementary material
Supplementary material (the experimental instructions) associ-
ated with this article can be found, in the online version, at 10.1016/j.
ejor.2015.10.039
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